October 1944

In the last days of September 1944 and following the final expulsion of the enemy from Brac, 212 Bty were hastily pulled back to Bari, Italy before being sent to Sarande, a port on the south-western Albanian coastline very close to the border with Greece and a short distance from the island of Corfu.

A force consisting of No. 2 Commando, No. 40 (Royal Marine) Commando and 212 Bty of 111 Fld Regt RA were pulled together under the moniker “Houndforce” and were tasked with capturing the port of Sarande. Detailed below are the records from the war diary for this action, starting at the end of September 1944.

The Germans held a strong garrison on Corfu, but with the Soviets pushing further and further into Europe from the east and the Allies doing likewise from the west, Hitler had to try to consolidate his forces and shorten his supply lines. The island on Corfu was to be abandoned by German troops, but there were only two escape routes available; (1) the Greek port of Igoumenitsa which was due to fall into the hands of the Greek Resistance at any moment, or (2) the Albanian port of Sarande, the importance of which had previously been raised by the Commanding Officer of Land Forces Adriatic (LFA), Brigadier G. M. O. Davy.


212 Battery, 111th Fd Regiment as part of “Houndforce”

The section of text below contains the transcibed action report of 212 Bty’s mission to Albania under Houndforce at the end of September and into the beginning of October 1944. The details of what the remainder of 111 Fd Regt were doing this month follows further on.

Report on activities of 212 Fld Bty RA in operations of HOUNDFORCE in S. ALBANIA

“Officer Commanding HOUNDFORCE, which had landed in ALBANIA with the object of capturing SARANDE, through which port the Germans were in the process of evacuating their troops on CORFU, had requested a Battery of 25 pdrs as additional support. To supply this need 212 Bty was withdrawn with haste from BRAC and after a brief pause for reorganisation was landed in ALBANIA on 28 Sept at about 09:30 hrs. The beach selected (NAN beach 200010) was in the area of BURSI, some 14 miles north of the original landing beach (SUGAR beach 270860) around which the main forces were gathered, but which gave access up a river bed to the main coastal road. A valley (COMMANDO Valley) led from Sugar Beach to this road but was only negotiable on foot or by mule.

Partisans were in firm control of this coastal road for some 20 miles North of BURSI and South to NIVICE E BUBARIT 300882, and in virtual control as far as the road and valley junction at 306860. South from SHEN VASIL 295895, however, this road was under almost continual observation by the enemy at DELVINE 4087 and Point 282 (369841), and cover for anything other than infantry was extremely scarce in all the open country that lay in the triangle SHEN VASIL – DELVINE – SARANDE.”

“Next day at nine-twenty we sailed easterly, passed Brindisi at 16.30 and were there joined by our escort, 1 destroyer L43 (HMS Blackmore). We were given all the dope on our latest job – we were going to Albania to sort out some Gerries trying to get away from Corfu. We went to bed that night feeling quite excited. Upon awakening, we saw the barren coastline of Albania, drizzling it was at the time, 6. a.m.

There is no thrill quite like sailing in close in barges and not knowing which cliff or hill isn’t filled with the enemy and when a dozen guns are going to open up on you. Our destroyer took the lead with her gun crews standing too. However, we got in safely and landed on a sandy beach, which no one could confirm as being free from mines, we got off that as quickly as possible and at ten a.m. the recce parties were off. B.C. and H. went, I clinging grimly onto the trailer, we passed through a small village Lukova and were there greeted by the populace some forty individuals with clapping and flung flowers. They were obviously very pleased to see us.

The houses were much more poorly built than anywhere I have seen, merely hovels and the people all looked quite ill. We found some gun positions near a small village called Shen Vasil, ordered up the guns and found ourselves a house in the village for command post.”

Diary entry from 27th September 1944 from Sgt Observer Frederick Sidney Williams, 212 Bty, 111 Fd Regt in his family’s memoirs “Our Fred’s War”.

“On disembarkation “G” and “O” parties proceeded south to recce. Gun group was ordered to follow to road bend just short of SHEN VASIL. On arrival here the recce parties found a section of 11 Troop RSR in action in the village. Occupation of any position forward of the village by daylight was found impracticable owing to enemy observation and temporary positions where chosen and occupied just to the west of SHEN VASIL village. These positions were to prove permanent for the operation. Guns were in action by 15:50 hrs.

Information was practically nil and it was obvious from the start that the main problems to solve would be communications and supply. The road forward from the village was in full view, with COMMANDO valley purely pedestrian; and the road back to BURSI was typically Balkan, blown and bruised, winding and precarious, just negotiable. Already heavy rain was falling to increase the hazards of the road, which seemed itself to be the main drainage channel for the mountain watersheds, and to swell the river into the most formidable obstacle of all.

The ferrying of ammunition and supplies along this road was put under way, arrangements were made to get the RSR OP (Captain Ross, MC RA) to register the battery on targets along the SARANDE – DELVINE road, and a line party was prepared to start laying a line forward to Brigade as soon as dusk fell. Meanwhile the Battery Commander (Major DANIEL, RA) went in search of information, contacting a representative of 2 Special Service Brigade who had been sent to NAN beach from Brigade HQ. Information was that our own troops held Pt 586 (302847), Road and Valley junction at 306860, and were on the forward slopes of ridge in area 282837. Brigade HQ was established at 285863. It was hoped to attack as soon as possible. The Battery Commander was to move with his party to Brigade HQ and one O.P Party was to joing the forward troops on Pt 586.

Wireless communication to Brigade was established by 17:00 hrs and line by 22:00 hrs. By first light on the 29th, Battery Commander was established at Brigade and Captain CUTRESS as OP on Point 586 (302847). This OP then moved forward with Commandos to Point 469 (319820) arriving about 13:00 hrs”.

28th September 1944 – Shen Vasil, Albania
Fierce rain and exposure made any immediate attack on SARANDE impracticable and the onus of aggression temporarily fell on the artillery. 500 rpg were to be maintained in gun positions for the attack when this became feasible and in the meantime all possible targets were to be engaged. Local protection for the guns was afforded by the Partisans with whom liaison was maintained through and interpreter.

The battery settled down to a long period of purely artillery activity.
29th September 1944 – Shen Vasil, Albania
Heavy Rain: Bad visibility throughout the day reduced visibility, but known enemy positions along the road were registered. Replacement VHF set for RAF Party, then established with Brigade, arrived at Battery Command Post, Brigade having made arrangements to transfer all this party to our area.
30th September 1944 – Shen Vasil, Albania
Rain: During morning until about 11:00hrs when visibility again closed, the battery carried out many shoots on enemy movement at various points along SARANDE – DELVINE road, on suspected gun positions and on two schooners in the area of SARANDE harbour. A phantom shop of 4000 tons was reported at various conflicting points and caused a slight stir but, true to tradition, never put in at any port.

The RAF party of 1 Officer and 1 Corporal arrived from Brigade and the VHF set was set up at the Battery Command post in the village.
1st October 1944 – Shen Vasil, Albania
Rain: Visibility again poor throughout the day but SARANDE harbour and suspected guns were engaged. At 21:00 hrs information was received from deserters that the enemy were ferrying troops from CORFU to DELVINE through SARANDE throughout the hours of darkness. A ship arrived nightly at SARANDE at about 23:00hrs. A considerable harassing fire programme was therefore fired in conjunction with the RSR on SARANDE harbour and points along the road.
2nd October 1944 – Shen Vasil, Albania
OP Party (Captain PITT, RA who had relieved Captain CUTRESS) on froward slopes of Pt 469 had a brush with an enemy patrol that had approached the OP from the rear. L/Bombardier TAYLOR, J. Was slightly wounded (machine gun bullet in calf). No other casualties were suffered and the party retired safely to the protection of forward infantry. Enemy movement was engaged whenever spotted. At night more harassing fire was fired on the road.
3rd October 1944 – Shen Vasil, Albania
Mortar positions, 2 flat bottomed barges and movement on road engaged. Usual harassing fire by night. Partisan sources reported casualties caused to enemy by previous night’s shelling.
4th October 1944 – Shen Vasil, Albania
Many targets engaged in better visibility and weather conditions. First heavy enemy return fire. Three medium calibre guns from DELVINE and long range battery on CORFU fired on the village and gun positions from 15:00 hrs to 17:00 hrs. Gunners BUTTERFIELD, HOLDEN and SHEPHERD injured. Gunner BUTTERFIELD subsequently died. Despite urgent and reiterated representations no English doctor had arrived in our area and the treatment of all casualties and sick devolved mainly on the Battery Medical Orderly Gunner YATES, W. with the slender resources of a battery first-aid kit. The fortuitous arrival of a German doctor deserter only slightly relieved the situation as he was entirely without supplies.

“We had three casualties today – Butterfield, Holden and Shepherd. Eric got it pretty badly and died of an internal hemorrhage. The medical arrangements at first were disgraceful – the only medic we had for the first week or so was Bill Yates. He worked like a slave but, of course, hadn’t the knowledge or the tools for any big job. We had rum rations almost every night and needed them to keep us going. A few Germans deserted to the partisans and they, two in particular often came to see us, talking to us and playing a little chess.”

Partisans were in firm control of this coastal road for some 20 miles North of BURSI and South to NIVICE E BUBARIT 300882, and in virtual control as far as the road and valley junction at 306860. South from SHEN VASIL 295895, however, this road was under almost continual observation by the enemy at DELVINE 4087 and Point 282 (369841), and cover for anything other than infantry was extremely scarce in all the open country that lay in the triangle SHEN VASIL – DELVINE – SARANDE.”

Diary entry from 4th October 1944 from Sgt Observer Frederick Sidney Williams, 212 Bty, 111 Fd Regt in his family’s memoirs “Our Fred’s War”.

NOTE: Many sources, including the official War Diary for 111 Fd Regt make reference to the horrendous weather that the men had to endure for weeks on end. The mountainous terrain and persistent torrential rain led to a large proportion the fighting force developing trench foot, as shown in the accounts below

“ ‘A drop of rain never hurt anyone…’ A drop? After eight days of continual downpour – of monsoon proportions – the weather had become a more significant influence on the outcome of the operation than the strength of the enemy. The difficulty of moving troops burdened with heavy loads over such terrain had already been recognised: by 1 October the situation, aggravated by endless torrential rain, had become almost impossible. All attempts at transferring stores to staging posts up the valley were abandoned when an increasing number of men had to be returned to Sugar Beach, requiring medial treatment for exposure, exhaustion and trench-foot. The prevalence of trench foot was admitted with chastening apology. It was almost a matter of shame that such a condition could immobilise a modern fighting force within a week, providing convincing testimony to the suffering, fortitude and tolerance of First World War victims, who had had to wallow about in such conditions for months on end and considered such deprivations the very least of their problems. Imagine the white pulpiness of skin after lengthy immersion in water, which we have all experienced, then try to visualise that skin adhering to one’s socks and coming away with the garment’s removal. It was a sight sickening to observe, let alone be afflicted by. Why I was not a victim is beyond my understanding.”

Excerpt from “Raiding Support Regiment: The Diary of a Special Forces Soldier 1943-4” by Walter Jones explaining his experiences during the attack on Sarande


During the whole of this time we experienced torrential rain both night and day. I had never seen anything like it before, tough I served in Burma during my subaltern days and know what monsoon rain was like; every valley became a torrent, and the soldiers were wet through all the time. There was no cover to be had, for there were no houses so it was impossible to dry anything. The men had one groundsheet each and one blanket. The blanket was permanently soaking, and the groundsheet was used in an attempt to provide cover, but this could only be done by attaching it to two boulders, and invariably the weight of water soon collapsed the ‘tent’. The men’s boots were soaking also, and soon began to break open owing to the rockiness of the mountains and their dampness.

The expedition had been mounted in a hurry, and as if for a raid of three or four days duration. Only twelve mules had been sent. And these, apart from being totally inadequate in number, soon ran out of the fodder which had been provided. The hills were so steep and rocky that the mules were unable to negotiate the worst places., and every man of the two Commandos who was not actually manning a forward post had to be used as a porter to carry boxes of rations or ammunition up to the hill positions. This was a most punishing ordeal, and I had 200 cases of exposure and trench feet in the first ten days. As my fighting strength was only 650, this was an alarming proportion.”

Excerpt from “Commando Crusade”  by Major-General T. Churchill.


“It started to rain and rained for nine days. About the third day we were detailed off to unload a landing craft putting stores onto the beach. It was miserable work as it was sheeting down with rain. We got finished after dark. Pat and I found a cave just off the beach, not really a cave, more of a depression, a hole really, but cosy enough once we had pulled our capes across the top to form a roof. We’d just got settled when we heard Johnny Wisdom, our Lieutenant, calling: “Sanderson, Patterson!” We debated whether to say anything. It might’ve been another landing craft to unload. In the end we called out to him and he came over to our ‘cave’. He’d brought us some cigarettes, a pack of twenty, and some matches. We managed to drop the matches early on and chain smoked the rest of the cigarettes rather than wait for more matches the next day.

We were up and down these mountains. We had casualties from trench feet and exposure. Then, when it stopped raining, we were short of water. After we’d been there about five days I was feeling a bit groggy so I went to see the ‘quack’ and he put me on ‘light duties’ and I wondered how I could manage that in a heavy weapons troop. By this time I was carrying the barrel of the gun which was heavier still.

On the ninth of October, exactly a year after the bombing of HMS Carlisle, the attack was due. As we moved up to our jumping off point, I just couldn’t go any further and I collapsed. They left me on top of this mountain with some water and emergency rations. The next morning, drifting in and out of consciousness, I heard the noise of the attack. The day after that they brought a stretcher up for me and took me down to the beach into an aid tent. I was a bit delirious by then so I’m not sure about this, but I thought there was a German doctor in the tent. For some reason he had some bottles of beer and wouldn’t let me have any. I was annoyed about this as it didn’t seem right. I was put onto a landing craft and then a hospital train and was taken to hospital in Brindisi. I had malaria. I lot of chaps came down with it. I hadn’t realised how rife it was then in Italy. I lost a lot of weight. We were put on a special diet: American tinned chicken and jelly and custard — queer stuff. I got up one day and the Sister told me to get back into bed again. I was in about a fortnight.”

William Sanderson of 40 Commando’s recollection of the attack on Sarande, Albania, from his entry to the BBC’s “WW2 – Peoples War” project.
Link


“As the days went by, I seemed to lose all interest in things and gradually I grew feverish, then I’m afraid I began to ramble and have absolutely no lucid recollections of anything that happened after the above until I came around to find myself in hospital in Bari. I have vague memories of bright lights and a blaring wireless, sweet tea and Guinness and the pleasantness of tobacco. However, as I said, I found myself in the 98th General in Bari. They had three attempts at proving I had malaria but finally they succeeded and I had to undergo the treatment. In my ward were several commandos who had been on the Albanian job and who had all contracted malaria, what a place that had been for us. The doctor told us, our own M.O. I mean, that the whole population of Shen Vasil, 100%, were suffering from the fever. I myself had seen women collapse in the streets and sit or lie moaning until they could find the energy to carry on again and our M.O. was unable to do a thing about it, he scarcely had enough in the way of medical supplies for his own men.”

Diary entry from  October 1944 from Sgt Observer Frederick Sidney Williams, 212 Bty, 111 Fd Regt in his family’s memoirs “Our Fred’s War”.

5th October 1944 – Shen Vasil, Albania
Visibility fair during day. Many targets engaged including staff car and motorcycle combination on road which both crashed. The passenger in this motorcycle subsequently deserted to the RSR and wished his thanks conveyed to the artillery for giving him the opportunity. Enemy return fire arrived spasmodically throughout the day. Pilot Officer WILKINSON injured, not seriously and damage was caused to the VHF set (battery rendered useless).
A Medical Officer (Captain MARMIOM) arrived at 16:00 hrs and arrangements were made to evacuate any casualties by LCP to a sick bay established in an LCH at SUGAR beach.
A valuable addition to fire power arrived in the shape of an LCG which was beached at SUGAR beach and fired by the Battery OP.
6th October 1944 – Shen Vasil, Albania
Rain. Enemy movement on road during day practically nil. OP fired LCG onto targets in DELVINE area.
7th October 1944 – Shen Vasil, Albania
Weather improved slightly. A destroyer joined the artillery and was fired by the Bty OP but its shells failed to detonate. Little enemy movement was observed during the day but smoke was observed from the area of several enemy positions. At 16:18 hrs a Spitfire strafed ‘D’ Troop position, Shooting was accurate and a Jeep was beautifully peppered. The Command Post narrowly escaped damage. At 16:20 hrs, ‘D’ Troop improved its camouflage.

At 19:00 hrs the enemy opened up heavy fire against the area of the village and the surrounding hills. Three or more medium guns from DELVINE and 4 – 6 lighter guns, apparently somewhere along the SARANDE – DELVINE road fired what appeared to be an artillery programme. Fire was continuous and dispersed. As communications with Brigade were soon cut the situation was obscure and the Battery stood to. Nothing developed and the fire ceased as abruptly as it began at 19:45 hrs. It was thought that the fire had been to cover enemy movement along the road and a harassing fire programme had been fired in retaliation. The area of the guns was plotted from flash bearings and the Battery prepared to engage the area at short notice, but the remainder of the night passed quietly.
8th October 1944 – Shen Vasil, Albania
It had been decided to attack SARANDE on the morning of the 9th. The 8th was mainly spent in preparation registration of targets, liaison with Partisans, preparation of ammunition etc.
The plan of attack was:
H Hour 04:00hrs. 40 Commando were to capture Pt 261 (312809, clear area East of SARANDE and exploit to the town itself. 2 Commando were to capture enemy strong-point and 25 pdr position at 336796. A force of about 120 IRAQ LEVIES paratroops were to land by sea in cove at 332762, capture Pt 264 (340788) and consolidate on this point, dominating the road from SARANDE. Partisans were to capture VERMERO 342823 and the VERMERO Ridge and to exploit south east to GJASHTE and south west to VRION.
9th October 1944 – Shen Vasil, Albania
03:30hrs- Arty programme begins
04:30hrs – Battery completed its programme
06:05hrs – Enemy guns at DELVINE engaged
06:15hrs – Enemy movement on road engaged
06:35hrs – Pt. 261 reported clear
06:45hrs – SARANDE harbour engaged
06:52hrs – Enemy AA position in GJHASHTE engaged
07:00hrs – Enemy gun area DELVINE engaged
07:07hrs – VERMERO reported occupied by Partisans
07:30hrs – Pt. 264 in our hands
07:45hrs – Machine gun fire reported from VRION area engaged
08:40hrs – Battery fired a short improvised fire plan on VRION to support Partisans exploiting towards that area
09:45hrs – All first objectives reported taken and exploitation underway
10:30hrs – Enemy guns and OP at DELVINE engaged. 2 Commando reported only 100x short of enemy 25 pdr gun position
10:35hrs – Partisans reported to have captured VRION and moving to FINIK and GJASHTA
11:00hrs – DELVINE engaged
11:10hrs – Enemy 25 pdrs surrendered to 2 Commando
11:30hrs – GJASHTE occupied by Partisans
12:25hrs – Main enemy resistance now centred arround hospital on outskirts of SARANDE. Ultimatum delivered by Psychological Warfare Branch loudspeaker to Germans. No response
15:30hrs – Hospital garrison surrenders after heavy stonk by 4.2 mortars
16:30hrs – SARANDE town occupied
16:45hrs – Enemy guns at DELVINE engaged.

Briefly the main role of the Bty after the pre-arranged programme consisted of short fire-plans to support the Partisans’ exploitation south-west from VERMERO and the harassing of enemy guns in the DELVINE area. By last light German resistance in SARANDE and GJASHTE areas had practically ceased. While HOUNDFORCE consolidated the ground won it was the intention of the Partisans to advance the next day towards DELVINE. The Bty was asked to support this movement.

The night of 9/10 October was quiet. At 10:00hrs on 10th a programme was fired on FINIK 3793, SHIAN 3593 and MAVRNPOL 3694 which were all soon captured by the Partisans. Enemy resistance in GJASHTE area was completely eliminated during the morning.

On the 11th the battle moved West to the DELVINE area. The enemy were obviously pulling out fast and explosions and fires in and around the town were reported from first light and throughout the morning. The Partisans therefore decided to attack as soon as possible and a fire-plan was arranged to be fired from 04:00hrs on the 12th. Registration for this fire plan began at 17:15hrs, the Bty, the attached LCG and a troop of 3.7” AA guns which had arrived at SUGAR beach on the night of the 9th all registering the area. At 20:30hrs this fire-plan was cancelled. The naval and AA ranging salvos had convinced the local Partisans that this was the promised fire support and they attacked and captured DELVINE.

The battle soon passed out of range. The Germans were moving fast with the Partisans in pursuit. The numerous demolitions ruled out any further immediate artillery support as no sappers or bridging materials were available. By the 14th Partisans had already moved 15 miles on from DELVINE and were still without contact with the enemy.

On 13th October 3 jeeps and trailers, 3 Field Artillery Tractors and 1 x 3 tonner were despatched to NAN beach for the use of Special Service Brigade in a projected sweep of CORFU.

On the 17th the Bty was ordered out of action and returned to NAN beach for evacuation as soon as LCTs were available. ‘C’ Troop embarked and sailed on the 18th. The remainder of the Bty waited. A beach settlement (PITTSVILLE) was established and the Bty daily watched the river rise and the sea rise and fall. Ration visits from an LCP and curiosity visits from the LCH cheered the vigil and sunbathing, though variable, was refreshing after the dirt of SHEN VISIL. The Bty eventually sailed for ITALY on the 30th and arrived BARI on the afternoon of 31 October.

Supply had proved the greatest problem. From the administrative point of view the Bty and 11 Troop RSR formed virtually a separate force. The RSR transport was 1 Jeep. The Bty was on light scales. With these slender resources lines of communication of over 15 miles had to be maintained. Among the tasks that fell to the Bty apart from the supplying of ourselves and the RSR were the evacuation of casualties British and Partisan, repair of RAF wireless set and maintenance of their party, evacuation of British Military Mission personnel from KUCHI 2114 to BORSI, collection and delivery of fodder for starving mules in COMMANDO Valley and a taxi service for urgent Partisan requirements.

Maintenance of communication was only slightly less difficult. Enemy shelling was constantly breaking the telephone lines and the problems of wireless battery supply to isolated OPs were considerable and their maintenance required larger parties that we really were able to afford. The perpetual rain added to the normal difficulties.

During the operation the Bty fired 5576 rounds HE, of which 974 were fired supercharge.


Remainder of 111 Fd Regiment – October 1944

Whilst 212 Bty were busy on operations in Albania, the remainder of 111 Fd Regt were, at the start of October at least, split between Brac (Regimental HQ and 476 Bty) and Vis (211 Bty). Below is the continuation of the main war diary for 111 Fd Regt from 1st October.

1st October 1944 – Brac Island, Praznica
Instruction received from posting of Regimental Medical Officer Captain B. T. KIEFT, RAMC to Special Operations. Captain R. T. M. Puddicombe RAMC posted to Regt as replacement.
RA BRAC guns engaged hostile batteries on Yugoslav mainland and enemy vehicles seen moving along road in OMIS area.
2nd October 1944 – Brac Island, Praznica
Colonel JAGO went back from BRAC to VIS Island to discuss tactical situation and the Regiments’ Operation Role in future. Issued “Report on Operations in Central Adriatic Islands”. Intelligence Officer questioned two Croat civilians who had rowed over to Brac from mainland, and supplied useful intelligence.
3rd October 1944 – Brac Island, Praznica
Captain B. T. Kieft departed.
Colonel JAGO proceeded from VIS to BARI (Italy) and vistied HQLFA. Obtained information that 212 Bty had been sent as part of HOUNDFORCE to SARANDE (Southern Albania).
4th October 1944 – Brac Island, Praznica
Survey Officer Lieutenant T. P. Allen R.A. went with Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Blagden R.A., commander of 64 HAA Regt to SOLTA to recce HAA gun positions within range of SPLIT, CIOVO and DRVENIK (No Germans, except dead ones seen).
Signal received from C.O. saying Lysander plane had been sent to VIS to operate as an air O.P. for the BRAC guns.
Captain G. C. McLeod Carey (476 Bty) returned from PELJESAC recce, reporting no suitable areas for 25 pdrs in support of Partisan attack on STON, and therefore arranged for the Regiment’s four 75mm guns to be sent, manned by personnel of 31st L.A.A. Regt.
5th October 1944 – Brac Island, Praznica
Engaged concentration of German troops at ZADVARJE Q.3331 and defended areas on coast.
6th October 1944 – Brac Island, Praznica
Major Winterbottom (Commander 476 Bty), adjutants and I.O. visited HQ 12 Brigade YNAL for information and intelligence found them celebrating anniversary of foundation of Brigade and invited to join enormous luncheon party. Failed
7th October 1944 – Brac Island, Praznica
I.O. visited 12 Brigade YNAL again, this time arranged for Partisan labour to clear roads on SOLTA for HAA guns and for 1 Btn to protect gun area.
8th October 1944 – Brac Island, Praznica
Received signal from HQ VIS Brigade “Lieutenant-Colonel Blagden (Commander 64 HAA) to assume command of BRAC – RHQ 111 Field Regt to return to VIS – Signal Officer Lieutenant Kettle to go to VIS immediately!”.
Signal presented acute problems as 111 Fd Regt Signal Section were responsible for all communications on BRAC and manned link BRAC to VIS and the Regiment supplying high-grade cipher operations. Regimental personnel manning BRAC HQ also.
22:00hrs – Field programme in support of 1 Dalmatian Proletariat Brigade raid on Jugoslav mainland.
9th October 1944 – Brac Island, Praznica
13:00hrs – Main body Regimental HQ embarked and sailed for VIS, leaving behind Captain J. C. S. Jeffrey RA indefinitely to act as I.O and C.B.O; Major Cheeseman and Lieutenant Allen and part of Signals section to assist in handing over command and control to Colonel Blagden.
C.O. Lieutenant-Colonel JAGO returned to VIS from BARI, having been ordered to prepare to move Regimental HQ and 211 Bty via BARI to PATRAS (Northern Greece) to join staff of “VIS Brigade” commander Brigadier J. P. O’BRIEN-TWOHIG DSO (already there) in the organisation of Civil and Political conditions in liberated Greece, utilising the Regt’s Signals, REME, RAMC detachments and transport.
18:00hrs – LCT arrived KOMIZA (VIS) – another LCT sailed from KOMIZA for BARI with B Troop 211 Bty as first shipment for PATRAS operation.
10th October 1944 – Vis Island
Lieutenant A. A. G. Owen M.C. (CPO 211 Bty) sent on recce to MLJET Island to advise in the selection of HAA Troop position in support of the forthcoming Partisan attack on STON.
Captain Taylor (Bty Captain 476 Bty) came to VIS from BRAC – orders having been given for 476 Bty (less 1 Troop to remain on BRAC) to move to VIS in near future – there being no other arty remaining for the defence of VIS.
Captain McLeod Carey (Commander E Troop, 476 Bty) made one sortie from VIS over BRAC in the Lysander – but was unable to direct a shoot because wireless communications failed owing to the wrong length of trailing aerial.
Signals Officer Lieutenant a. C. Kebble returned to BRAC to supervise signals organisation of 64 HAA Regt and to bring back own Sigs personnel.
11th October 1944 – Vis Island
Air OP made two more sorties, but wireless again unsatisfactory.
12th October 1944 – Vis Island
RAF recalled Lysander to Italy, precluding further Air OP activity.
RHQ and A Troop and Bty HQ 211 Bty still ready to move to Italy, but with no definite promise of shipping.
19:00hrs – RHQ “Farewell to Vis” dinner party. Guests: Commander Morgan Giles RN, Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. G. Lineham, Wing Commander S. H. Bartlett RAF, Captain T. F. Wandle RA (ALO).
13th October 1944 – Vis Island
Movement of Partisans to PELJESAC and 43 (RM) Commando to Italy have priority on available shipping.
RHQ entertained and accommodated an American crew of one of the 25 B17 Fortresses and B24 Liberators returning from mass raid on Vienna which landed on VIS unable to reach Italy.
Captain Taylor MC returned to BRAC having left small parties to “hold” buildings and areas for 476 Bty less 1 troop.
14th October 1944 – Vis Island
476 Bty instructed to remain BRAC until RHQ and 211 Bty departs VIS.
15th October 1944 – Vis Island
22:00hrs – 21Again, only available shipping space occupied by higher priority. CO decided that if the whole body could not be moved, an attempt must be made to send leave party to BARI rest camp since no leave had been possible because of the operational demands of the past five months.
Afternoon football matches played.
16th October 1944 – Vis Island
Leave party prepared to move to BARI.
Troops issued with battledress of odd shapes, colours and sizes.
Leave party move cancelled owing to failure of LCT’s engines.
17th October 1944 – Vis Island
17:00hrs – Shipping now available and after considerate planning with loading tables, A Troop and Bty HQ 211 and RHQ embarkation commenced on 3 LCT’s and once LCI and the Yugoslav steamer GALEB – sailing from 22:00hrs and midnight.
18th October 1944 – Italy
15:15hrs – SS GALEB arrived MANFREDONIA. Partly disembarked and move in own jeeps to stage night in FOGGIA.
16:00hrs – Convoy with remainder of 211 and RHQ arrived BARLETTA and staged the night there.
19th October 1944 – Italy
12:00hrs – RHQ arrived at SANTERAMO (P.3247) and established in school buildings arranged in preparation by Captain A. L. McTiffin, Commander of Regimental Rear Details.
211 Bty billeted in GRAVINA (P.0153).
SS GALEB party arrived from FOGGIA at 14:00hrs.
Immediate arrangements for 100 from 211 Bty and 50 from RHQ to go on leave to Bari Rest Camp and 2 Officers from 211 Bty and Adjutant to Hotel Imperiale – for five days.
20th October 1944 – BARI area, Italy
Major J. B. H. Daniel RA returned from SARANDE, Houndforce Operation successfully completed. 212 Bty to return to BARI as soon as shipping available.
23:00hrs – Lieutenant-Colonel JAGO departed with Colonel MacNamara (Chief of Staff LFA – Land Forces Adriatic) on recce to DUBROVNIK (recently captured by Partisans) to arrange for projected Operation FLOYD in which 111 Fd Regt RA with protecting force from 43 (RM) Commando and 75mm Troop “E” Bty RSR, comprising FLOYDFORCE commander Colonel JAGO to support Partisans in delaying the German withdrawal from GREECE and ALBANIA.
211 Bty and RHQ to be at 12 hours’ notice to move from midday 22 October.
21st October 1944 –  BARI area, Italy
10:00hrs – Second in Command attended conference at HQ LFA to discuss movement and “Q” matters for Operation FLOYD.
C Troop – 212 Bty arrived at MONOPOLI from CORFU after a very rough passage affecting 80% of the passengers with a period of 2 hours when LCT was adrift with engine failure and almost ran aground on “heel” of Italy.
21:00hrs – C Troop established with RHQ in school at SANTERAMO.
23rd October 1944 –  BARI area, Italy
Regt received a further issue of battledress which enabled all personnel to have one well-matched and well-fitting suit.
RHQ and 211 Bty leave parties returned from Rest Camp.
25th October 1944 –  BARI area, Italy
10:00hrs – Major Cheesman (Second in Command), Major Turner (Commander 211 Bty) and Captain Dishley (adjutant) attended conference at HQ LFA of some 25-30 staff officers to discuss and arrange loading details for move to DUBROVNIK. Second in Command called Regimental Officers Conference for 18:00hrs at LFA when the movement order was to be ready and collected.
18:00hrs – Regimental Officers assembled for Conference.
18:30hrs – Movement Order not yet ready, conference adjourned until 21:00.
21:00hrs – Conference assembled and fresh orders given for loading owing to different arrangements in the Movement Order from those decided at conference, and loading to commence at 08:00hrs 26 October.
26th October 1944 –  BARI area, Italy
08:00hrs – Regimental vehicles arrived Bari Docks for loading, but embarkation delayed because no deck labour available for loading dead weight cargo.
11:00hrs – Some vehicles loaded onto first LCT. No indication yet of sailing time. One LCT yet to come.
18:00hrs – Information received that convoy not expected to sail until 15:00hrs 27 October. Meals prepared and billets found for troops on quayside. One LCT still to come – one still to be loaded.
27th October 1944 –  BARI area, Italy
12:00hrs – RHQ arrived at SANTERAMO (P.3247) and established in school buildings arranged in preparation by Captain A. L. McTiffin, Commander of Regimental Rear Details.
211 Bty billeted in GRAVINA (P.0153).
SS GALEB party arrived from FOGGIA at 14:00hrs.
Immediate arrangements for 100 from 211 Bty and 50 from RHQ to go on leave to Bari Rest Camp and 2 Officers from 211 Bty and Adjutant to Hotel Imperiale – for five days.
28th October 1944 –  GRUZ (Dubrovnik)
10:15hrs – Convoy arrived at GRUZ harbour, Dubrovnik, met by Colonel JAGO.
Force HQ, Regimental HQ and billets established in area GRUZ and LAPAD, in accommodation previously arranged by Colonel JAGO.
17:00hrs – Brigadier Conference in HOTEL ZAGREB attended by Colonel JAGO, Major Turner, Major MUNRO (Commander 43 RM Commando) and unit officers. “SPADEFORCE” created, comprising 1 Troop 211 Bty with 1 Troop 43 (RM) Commando for protection to support 1 BOKA Brigade and 2 Dalmatian Brigade (Partisan Promonsko Group) in annihilation of German positions in and to the south of RISAN (SA8544), and prevention of evacuation from KOTOR through RISAN.
Major P. S. Turner MC RA (211 Bty) to command SPADEFORCE.
29th October 1944 –  GRUZ (Dubrovnik)
07:00hrs – Recce party comprising Colonel JAGO, Major Turner, B Troop 211 Bty Officers, 43 (RM) Commando Officers and Sappers departed for RISAN area. Owing to bridges having been blown by the Germans between TREBINJE and VILUSE, all movement must be to the north from TREBINJE – BILECA and south again BILECA to VILUSE, more than double the distance.
Area LEDENICE and GRKOVAC (8748) found occupied by the enemy and B Troop put into action at POD HAN 834533. B Troop OP at 805500, overlooking GRKOVAC. Major Turner’s OP and Tac HQ at POLJICE 844459 with excellend command RISAN and LEDENICE.
13:00hrs – Adjutant and I.O. attended luncheon at IMPERIAL HOTEL, DUBROVNIK given by 2 Dalmatian Corps YNAL in honour of the supporting British Troops.
15:00hrs – 476 Bty (Commanded by Major E. M. Winterbottom RA) arrived from VIS at GRUZ and were installed in Tobacco Factory
Imperial Hotel in Dubrovnik which still stands today.
30th October 1944 –  GRUZ (Dubrovnik)
FLOYDFORCE HQ now established at GRUZ Harbour. All communications by 111 Fd Regt Signal Section – with 22 Set Link to SPADEFORCE 70 miles away with Relay Station at VILUSE Relay Station 736697, control at Regimental HQ. Rear link by 12-set at FORCE HQ to LRA with Regimental surveyors acting as cipher clerks.
12:30hrs – Colonel JAGO returned from RISAN area and sent off SITREP to LFA.
15:00hrs – Major Coulbourn (Psychological Warfare Branch) visited RHQ to discuss psychological warfare and firing of propaganda shell with Colonel JAGO.
17:00hrs – Major KARMEL (British Military Mission) visited officers mess (established in a villa).
31st October 1944 –  GRUZ (Dubrovnik)
09:00hrs – Colonel JAGO attended Brigadier’s conference at FORCE HQ to formulate plan for delaying enemy in the event of his breaking through NIKSIC or RISAN by withdrawing from gun positions at NIKSIC or PODHAN to access VILUSE, BILECA, TREBINJE and DUBROVNIK.
14:00hrs – Colonel JAGO made recce of DUBROVNIK area for gun areas and OP’s and defence. “A” Troop ordered to prepare to move to join “B” Troop, 211 Bty with SPADEFORCE.